Bicretieria Optimization in Routing Games by Busch, Costas & Kannan, Rajgopal
ar
X
iv
:0
80
1.
48
51
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  3
1 J
an
 20
08
Bicriteria Optimization in Routing Games
Costas Busch
Computer Science Department
Louisiana State University
280 Coates Hall
Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA
busch@csc.lsu.edu
Rajgopal Kannan
Computer Science Department
Louisiana State University
279 Coates Hall
Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA
rkannan@csc.lsu.edu
Abstract
Two important metrics for measuring the quality of routing paths are the maximum edge con-
gestion C and maximum path length D. Here, we study bicriteria in routing games where each
player i selfishly selects a path that simultaneously minimizes its maximum edge congestion Ci
and path length Di. We study the stability and price of anarchy of two bicriteria games:
• Max games, where the social cost is max(C,D) and the player cost is max(Ci, Di). We
prove that max games are stable and convergent under best-response dynamics, and that
the price of anarchy is bounded above by the maximum path length in the players’ strategy
sets. We also show that this bound is tight in worst-case scenarios.
• Sum games, where the social cost is C+D and the player cost is Ci+Di. For sum games, we
first show the negative result that there are game instances that have no Nash-equilibria.
Therefore, we examine an approximate game called the sum-bucket game that is always
convergent (and therefore stable). We show that the price of anarchy in sum-bucket games
is bounded above by C∗ ·D∗/(C∗+D∗) (with a poly-log factor), where C∗ and D∗ are the
optimal coordinated congestion and path length. Thus, the sum-bucket game has typically
superior price of anarchy bounds than the max game. In fact, when either C∗ or D∗ is
small (e.g. constant) the social cost of the Nash-equilibria is very close to the coordinated
optimal C∗+D∗ (within a poly-log factor). We also show that the price of anarchy bound
is tight for cases where both C∗ and D∗ are large.
1 Introduction
Routing is a fundamental task in communication networks. Routing algorithms provide paths
for packets that will be sent over the network. There are two metrics that quantify the quality
of the paths returned by a routing algorithm: the congestion C, which is the maximum number
of paths that use any edge in the network, and the maximum path length D. Assuming there
is a packet for each path, a lower bound on the delivery time of the packets is Ω(max(C,D))
(alternatively, Ω(C +D)). Actually, there exist packet scheduling algorithms that given the paths,
they deliver the packets along the paths in time close to optimal O(max(C,D)) (alternatively,
O(C +D)) [7, 17, 18, 23, 25].
Motivated by the selfish behavior of entities in communication networks, we study routing games
where each packet’s path is controlled independently by a selfish player. We model games with N
players, where each player has to select a path from a source to a destination node. The objective of
each player i is to select a path that simultaneously minimizes two parameters: the congestion Ci,
which is the maximum number of paths that use any edge in player i’s path, and the path length
Di. We examine two kinds of games: max games, where the player’s cost function is max(Ci,Di),
and sum games, where the player’s cost function is Ci +Di. In each of these games, the player’s
objective is to selfishly minimize its cost in an uncoordinated manner. From the player’s point of
view, the minimization of the sum or max cost functions are justified objectives, since it is shown
in [3] that player i’s packet can be delivered in time O˜(Ci +Di) (alternatively, O˜(max(Ci,Di)).
A natural problem is to determine the effect of the players’ selfishness on the welfare of the whole
communication network. In the max and sum games, the welfare of the network is measured with
the social cost functions max(C,D) and C+D, respectively. The choice of these social cost functions
is appropriate since they determine the total time needed to deliver the packets represented by the
players. We examine the consequence of the selfish behavior in Nash equilibria, which are stable
states of the game where no player can unilaterally improve her situation. The effect of selfishness
is quantified with the price of anarchy (PoA) [16, 24], which expresses how much larger is the worst
social cost in a Nash equilibrium compared to the social cost in the optimal coordinated solution.
We study the existence of Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy for max games and sum games,
where we find that these games produce different results with their own merits.
1.1 Max Games
First, we examine max games (the social cost is max(C +D)). We prove that every max game has
at least one Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium can be obtained by best response dynamics, where
a player greedily changes, whenever possible, the current path to an alternative path with lower
cost. With best response moves the game eventually converges to a Nash-equilibrium. We show
that the optimal coordinated solution is a Nash-equilibrium too. Thus, max games games have very
good Nash equilibria. This observation is quantified in terms of the price of stability (PoS) [1, 2]
which expresses how much larger is the best social cost in a Nash equilibrium with respect to the
social cost in the optimal coordinated solution. Therefore in max games it holds that PoS = 1.
We then examine the worst Nash equilibria. We bound the price of anarchy (PoA) in max
games with respect to the maximum allowable path length L for the players in the network, and
the number of nodes n in the graph:
PoA = O(L+ log n).
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We prove that this bound is worst case optimal (within additive terms). Specifically, we provide
an example game in a ring network where the optimal coordinated social cost is 1, while there is a
Nash equilibrium with cost O(L) = O(n).
1.2 Sum Games
We continue with examining sum games (the social cost is C+D). Intuitively, sum games have the
potential to give better price of anarchy than the max games because both parameters (C and D)
affect the choices at all the time, even when one parameter is larger than the other. For example,
the ring game that we mentioned above has price of anarchy equal to 1 in the sum game. However,
we prove a limitation of sum games: not all sum games have Nash equilibria; there exist instances of
sum games with a small number of players that do not have Nash equilibria at all. This limitation
directed us towards exploring alternative games which are stable (have Nash equilibria) and have
similar characteristics with the original sum games.
We found such a game variation that we call sum-bucket game. In sum-bucket games the players
are divided into log n classes, called buckets, according to the packet paths that they choose. Bucket
k holds the paths of players with length in range [2k, 2k−1). Suppose that player i’s path is in bucket
k. The normalized congestion of player i, denoted Ci, is measured with respect to the paths that
belong to bucket k. The normalized length of player i’s path is Di = 2
k−1 − 1, (which is a factor
2 approximation of the original length). Player i’s cost function is Ci +Di. Thus, in sum-bucket
games only players in the same bucket compete with each other, while players in different buckets do
not interfere. The normalized social cost function is defined to be C+D, where C is the maximum
normalized congestion in any bucket, and D is the maximum normalized depth of all paths.
We first show that sum-bucket games always have Nash equilibria, which can be obtained with
best response dynamics. We then examine the quality of the Nash equilibria. For every game
there is a corresponding coordinated bucket routing problem. We can bound the price of anarchy
PoA with respect to the normalized optimal congestion C
∗
and normalized path length D
∗
in the
optimal coordinated solution. We obtain:
PoA = O
(
C
∗ ·D∗
C
∗
+D
∗ · log2 n
)
Therefore, when either of C
∗
or D
∗
is small (e.g. a constant), the Nash equilibrium provides a very
good approximation (within a poly-log factor from optimal) to the uncoordinated routing problem.
In such scenarios, the price of selfishness is small. However, when both C
∗
or D
∗
are simultaneously
large, the approximation becomes worse (though still typically lower than the PoA of the max game
since the PoA is bounded by the smaller of C
∗
or D
∗
, where D
∗
< 2L). Nevertheless, even in these
scenarios the PoA bound is tight in certain games instances.
Sum-bucket games are interesting variations of sum games because they are stable, and they
can be used to approximate solutions for the C +D social cost. For any sum-bucket game, there
is a corresponding “original” coordinated routing problem where the objective is to minimize the
social cost C + D without using buckets. It holds that C ≤ C ≤ C · log n and D ≤ D ≤ 2D;
thus, C + D = O(C · log n + D). In other words, the normalized social cost can be used as
an approximation for the “original” social cost. Let PoA′ denote how much larger is the worst
equilibrium of a sum-bucket game compared to the optimal solution of the coordinated original
problem (with respect to the social cost C +D). It holds that PoA′ ≤ PoA · log n. Consequently,
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the observations that we made above for the PoA in sum-bucket games apply also with respect to
the original routing problem. For example, when one of C∗ or D∗ is small (e.g. a constant), then
the Nash equilibrium of the sum-bucket game provides a very good approximation (within a poly
log factor from optimal) to the coordinated original routing problem.
1.3 Related Work
Routing games (on congestion) were introduced and studied in [22, 26]. The notion of price of
anarchy was introduced in [16]. Since then, many routing game models have been studied which
are distinguished by the topology of the network, cost functions, type of traffic (atomic or splittable),
nature of strategy sets, and kind of equilibria (pure or mixed). Specifically, pure equilibria with
atomic flow have been studied in [4, 5, 19, 26, 31] (our work fits into this category), and with
splittable flow in [27, 28, 29, 30]. Mixed equilibria with atomic flow have been studied in [8, 9, 10,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 24], and with splittable flow in [6, 11].
To our knowledge there is no previous work that considers routing games that optimize two
criteria simultaneously. Most of the work in the literature uses a single cost metric which is related
to the congestion. A common metric for the player cost is the sum of the congestions on all the
edges of the player’s path (we denote this kind of player cost as pc′) and the respective social cost
is the cost of the worst player’s path (we denote this social cost as SC ′) [5, 14, 28, 29, 30, 31].
However, as we discussed before, in packet scheduling algorithms, the pc′ or SC ′ do not govern the
packet delays; max(Ci,Di) or Ci +Di govern the packet delay.
Other combinations of player costs and social costs have been studied in the literature: player
cost pc′ and social cost C has been studied in [5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 21, 24, 27]; player cost
Ci and social cost C has been studied in [4]; other variations have been studied in [13, 19, 20, 26].
The vast majority of the work on routing games has been performed for parallel link networks,
with only a few exceptions on general network topologies [4, 5, 6, 27].
Our work is closer to [4]. We extended some results presented in [4] to apply to bicriteria,
instead of the single criterium of congestion, player cost Ci and social cost C, that was used
in [4]. Specifically, the particular techniques that we use to prove existence of Nash equilibria with
best response dynamics, and also to prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy, were originally
introduced in [4]. Here, we modified and extended appropriately these techniques in a non-trivial
way to apply to our new cost functions.
Outline of Paper
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we give basic definitions. We study max games in Section 3
and sum games in Section 4. We finish with our conclusions in Section 5. Due to space limitations
some proofs have moved to the appendix.
2 Definitions
An instance of a routing game is a tuple R = (N, G,P), where N = {1, 2, . . . , N} are the players,
G = (V,E) is a graph with nodes V and edges E, and the graph has paths P = ⋃i∈NPi, where
Pi is a collection of available paths in G for player i. Each path in Pi is a path in G that has the
same source ui ∈ V and destination vi ∈ V ; each path in Pi is a pure strategy available to player
i. A pure strategy profile p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ] is a collection of pure strategies (paths), one for each
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player, where pi ∈ Pi. We refer to a pure strategy profile as a routing. On a finite network, a
routing game is necessarily a finite game.
For any routing p and any edge e ∈ E, the edge-congestion Ce(p) is the number of paths in
p that use edge e. For any path p, the path-congestion Cp(p) is the maximum edge congestion
over all edges in p, Cp(p) = maxe∈p Ce(p). We will use the notation Ci(p) = Cpi(p), for any
user i. The network congestion is the maximum edge-congestion over all edges in E, that is,
C(p) = maxe∈E Ce(p). We denote the length (number of edges) of any path p as |p|. For any user
i, we will also use the notation Dpi(p) or Di(p) to denote the length |pi|. The longest path length
in P is denoted L(P) = maxp∈P |p|. We will denote by D(p) the maximum path length in routing
p, that is D(p) = maxp∈p |p|. When the context is clear, we will drop the dependence on p and R
and use the notation Ce, Cp, Ci, C, L,Dp,Di,D.
For game R and routing p, the social cost (or global cost) is a function of routing p, and it
is denoted SC(p). The player or local cost is also a function on p denoted pci(p). We use the
standard notation p−i to refer to the collection of paths {p1, · · · , pi−1, pi+1, · · · , pN}, and (pi;p−i)
as an alternative notation for p which emphasizes the dependence on pi. Player i is locally optimal
in routing p if pci(p) ≤ pci(p′i;p−i) for all paths p′i ∈ Pi. A routing p is in a Nash Equilibrium
(we say p is a Nash-routing) if every player is locally optimal. Nash-routings quantify the notion
of a stable selfish outcome. A routing p∗ is an optimal pure strategy profile if it has minimum
attainable social cost: for any other pure strategy profile p, SC(p∗) ≤ SC(p).
We quantify the quality of the Nash-routings by the price of anarchy (PoA) (sometimes referred
to as the coordination ratio) and the price of stability (PoS). Let P denote the set of distinct Nash-
routings, and let SC∗ denote the social cost of an optimal routing p∗. Then,
PoS = inf
p∈ P
SC(p)
SC∗
, PoA = sup
p∈ P
SC(p)
SC∗
.
3 Max Games
Let R = (N, G,P) a routing game such that for any routing p the social cost function is SC(p) =
max(C(p),D(p)), and the player cost function pci(p) = max(Ci(p),Di(p)). We refer to such
routing games as max games. First, we show that max games have Nash-routings and the price of
stability is 1. Then, we bound the price of anarchy.
3.1 Existence of Nash-routings in Max Games
We show that max games have Nash-routings. We prove this result by first giving a totaly order
for the routings using a form of lexicographic ordering. Then we show that any greedy move of
a player can only give a new routing with smaller order. Thus, the greedy moves will converge
either to the smallest routing or to a routing where no player can improve further. In either case,
a Nash-routing will be reached.
Let R = (N, G,P) be a max routing game. Let r = max(N,L). For any routing p we define the
routing vector M(p) = [m1(p), . . . ,mr(p)], where mi(p) = ai(p) + bi(p), and ai(p) is the number
of paths with congestion i, and bi(p) is the number of paths with length i. Note that if SC(p) = k
then mk 6= 0 and m′k = 0 for all k′ > k.
We define a total order on the routings as follows. Let p and p′ be two routings, with M(p) =
[m1, . . . ,mr], and M(p
′) = [m′1, . . . ,m
′
r]. We say that M(p) = M(p
′) if mi = m
′
i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
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We say that M(p) < M(p′) if there is a j, 1 ≤ j ≤ r, such that mk = m′k for all k > j, and
mj < m
′
j . We order the p and p
′ according to the order of their respective vectors, that is p ≤ p′
if and only if M(p) ≤ M(p′). Note that for any two p and p′ it either holds that p = p′ or p < p′.
That is, the routings are totally ordered.
Consider an arbitrary routing p. If p is not a Nash-routing, there is at least one user i which
is not locally optimal. Then a greedy move is available to player i in which the player can obtain
lower cost by changing the path from pi to some other path p
′
i with lower cost. In other words,
the greedy move takes the original routing p = (pi;p−i) to a routing p
′ = (p′i;p
′
−i) with improved
player cost pci(p
′) < pci(p), such that pi is replaced by p
′
i and the remaining paths stay the same
(p−i = p
′
−i). We show now that any greedy move gives a smaller order routing:
Lemma 3.1 If a greedy move by any player takes a routing p to a new routing p′, then p′ < p.
Proof: Let pci(p) = max(Ci(p),Di(p)) = k
max
1 , and min(Ci(p),Di(p)) = k
min
1 (clearly, k
max
1 ≥
kmin1 ). Let also pci(p
′) = max(Ci(p
′),Di(p
′)) = kmax2 , and min(Ci(p
′),Di(p
′)) = kmin2 (clearly,
kmax2 ≥ kmin2 ). Since player i can decrease its cost in p′, kmax2 < kmax1 . Consider now the vectors
M(p) = [m1, . . . ,mr] and M(p
′) = [m′1, . . . ,m
′
r]. These two vectors are the same except possibly
for entries kmax1 , k
min
1 , k
max
2 , k
min
2 , which correspond to the positions that are affected by paths pi
and p′i. It holds that mkmax1 > m
′
kmax
1
, since when the path switches to p′i, mkmax1 = akmax1 + bkmax1
decreases by at least one because either akmax
1
decreases by one (if the new path has lower congestion)
or bkmax
1
decreases by one (if the new path has lower length). Since kmax2 < k
max
1 , M(p) > M(p
′)
implying that p > p′.
Since there are only a finite number of routings, Lemma 3.1 implies that starting from arbitrary
initial state, every best response dynamic converges in a finite time to a Nash-routing, where every
player is locally optimal. Since the routings are totally ordered, there is a routing pmin which is
the minimum, that is, for all routings p, pmin ≤ p. Clearly, the minimum routing is also a Nash-
routing. The minimum routing pmin achieves also optimal social cost, since if there was another
routing p′ with lower social cost, then it can be easily shown that p′ < pmin, which is contradiction.
Thus, the price of stability is 1. Therefore, we have the following result:
Theorem 3.2 (Stability of max games) For any max game R, every best response dynamic
converges to a Nash-routing, and the price of stability is PoS = 1.
3.2 Price of Anarchy in Max Games
We bound the price of anarchy in max games. Consider a max routing game R = (N, G,P), where
G has n nodes. Theorem 3.2 implies that there is at least one Nash-routing. Consider a Nash-
routing p. Denote C = C(p) and D = D(p). Let p∗ be the optimum (coordinated) routing with
minimum social cost. Denote C∗ = C(p∗) and D∗ = D(p∗). Note that each payer i ∈ N has a path
pi ∈ p and a corresponding “optimal” path p∗i ∈ p∗ from the player’s source to the destination.
For each edge e ∈ G, denote Πe(p) the set of players whose paths in routing p use edge e. We
define H to be a set that contains all edges e ∈ G with congestion Ce(p) ≥ D + 2. Consider an
edge e ∈ H. Let i ∈ Πe(p) be a player whose path pi in routing p uses edge e. We define f(e, i)
to be a set that contains all edges e′ ∈ p∗i with Ce′(p) ≥ Ce(p) − 1. It holds that |f(e, i)| ≥ 1,
since in routing p player i prefers path pi instead of p
∗
i because there is at least one edge e
′ ∈ p∗i
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with Ce′(p) ≥ Ce(p) − 1 > D. Let f(e) = ∪i∈Πe(p)f(e, i). For any set of edges X ⊂ H, we define
f(X) =
⋃
e∈X f(e).
Lemma 3.3 Let Z be the set that contains all edges e with congestion Ce(p) ≥ C − 2 log n. If
C ≥ D + 2 lg n+ 2, then there is a set of edges X ⊆ Z such that |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|.
Proof: We recursively construct a sets of edges E0, . . . , E2 lgn, such that Ei = Ei−1 ∪ f(Ei−1),
and set E0 contains all the edges e with congestion Ce(p) = C. From the construction of those
sets it holds that for any e ∈ Ej, Ce(p) ≥ C − j, where 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n. Thus, Ej ⊆ Z, for all
0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n. (Note that Z ⊆ H.)
We can show that there is a j, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n, such that |f(Ej)| ≤ 2|Ej |. Suppose for contra-
diction that such a j does not exist. Thus for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n, it holds that |f(Ej)| > 2|Ej |. In
this case, it it straightforward to show that |Ek| > 2|Ek−1|, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 lg n. Since |E0| ≥ 1,
it holds that |E2 lgn| > 22 lgn = n2. However, this is a contradiction, since the number of edges in
G do not exceed n2.
Lemma 3.4 If C ≥ D + 2 lg n+ 2, then C < 2LC∗ + 2 lg n.
Proof: From Lemma 3.3, there is a set of edges X ⊂ Z with |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|. For each e ∈ Z it
holds that Ce(p) ≥ C − 2 lg n. Let M =
∑
e∈X Ce(p) ≥ |X|(C − 2 lg n), where M denotes the total
utilization of the edges in X by the paths of the players in Π. Let Π =
⋃
e∈X Πe(p), that is, Π is
the set of players which in routing p their paths use edges in X. By construction, the congestion
in routing p in each of the edges of X is caused only by the players in Π. Since path lengths are
at most L, each player in Π can use at most L edges in X. Hence, M ≤ L · |Π|. Consequently,
|X|(C − 2 lg n) ≤ L · |Π|, which gives: C ≤ (L · |Π|)/|X| + 2 lg n.
By the definition of f(X), in the optimal routing p∗ each user in Π has to use at least one
edge in f(X). Thus, edges in the optimal routing p∗, the edges in f(X) are used at least Π times.
Thus, there is some edge e ∈ f(X) with Ce(p∗) ≥ |Π|/|f(X)|. Therefore, C∗ ≥ |Π|/|f(X)|. Since
|f(X)| ≤ 2|X|, we obtain |Π| ≤ 2C∗ · |X|. Therefore: C ≤ 2LC∗ + 2 lg n.
Theorem 3.5 (Price of anarchy in max games) For any max game R it holds that PoA =
O(L+ log n).
Proof: Suppose that p is the worst Nash-routing with maximum social cost. We have
PoA = SC(p)/SC(p∗). If C ≥ D + 2 lg n + 2, then SC(p) = C. From Theorem 3.4,
PoA ≤ C/max(C∗,D∗) ≤ (2LC∗ + 2 lg n)/C∗ ≤ 2L + 2 lg n. If C < D + 2 lg n + 2, then
SC(p) < D + 2 lg n+ 2; thus PoA ≤ L+ 2 lg n+ 2. Hence, in both cases PoA = O(L+ log n).
There is a max game that shows that the result of Theorem 3.5 is tight in the worst case.
Consider a ring network with n nodes and n edges. Give the same orientation to the edges, so that
each edge has one left node and one right node. For each edge ei, there is a corresponding player i
whose source is the left node and the destination is the right node of the edge. The strategy set of
each player has two paths: path pi which is only the edge ei, and path p
′
i which goes around the ring.
Note that p = [p1, p2, . . . , pn] is a Nash-routing with social cost 1. However, p
′ = [p1, p2, . . . , pn] is
also a Nash routing with social cost n− 1. Thus, the price of anarchy is O(n) = O(L).
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4 Sum Games
Let R = (N, G,P) be a routing game such that for any routing p the social cost function is
SC(p) = C(p) + D(p), and the player cost function pci(p) = Ci(p) + Di(p). We refer to such
routing games as sum games. We first show that such games have instances without Nash-routings.
Then we describe a variation of sum games, that we call sum-bucket games, which are stable and
their equilibria have good properties.
4.1 A Sum Game without Nash-routings
Theorem 4.1 There is sum game instance R = (N, G,P) that has no Nash-routing.
Proof: The graph G is depicted in the figure below. There are seven players, namely, N =
{1, . . . , 7}. Players 1, 2, and 3, have respective strategy sets P1 = {p1, p′1}, P2 = {p2, p′2}, and
P3 = {p3, p′3}. In the figure for player i = 1, . . . , 3 the respective source and destination nodes are
ui and vi. There are six critical edges denoted e1, . . . , e6 that the paths use and which are shown in
the figure as straight horizontal lines. These edges may have congestion larger than 1. The squiggly
part of the paths are assumed to have congestion 1 and their length and their lengths are chosen
so that the following relations hold: |p′1| = |p1| − 2, |p′2| = |p2|+ 3, and |p′3| = |p3|+ 3.
p1 p1
p
′
1p
′
1
p2
p2
p3
p3
p
′
3
p
′
3
p
′
2
p
′
2
p1p
′
3 p1p2p3p1p
′
2
p
′
1p2 p
′
1p3
u1 u2 u3
e1 e2 e3
e4
(+1)
v1
e6e5
p
′
1
(+3) (+3) (+4)
v2v3
p2
p3
Players 4 to 7 are “passive” in the sense that they have only one path in their strategy sets,
and their sole purpose is to create additional congestion on edges e3, e4, e5, e6 (the paths of these
players are not shown explicitly in the figure). In particular, the passive players cause additional
congestion 1 to edge e3, additional congestion 3 to e4 and e5, and additional congestion 4 to e6.
The additional congestion is depicted in the figure inside a parenthesis under each edge.
Since the only “active” players are 1, 2, and 3, and each player has two path choices, there are
eight possible different routings. We examine each routing and prove that it is not a Nash-routing.
We use the vector [p1, p2, p3] to denote a routing where the ith position of the vector contains the
path choice of user i. By setting explicit values to the path lengths, and computing the player costs
in each routing, we find that: player 1 is not locally optimal in routings [p1, p2, p3] and [p
′
1, p
′
2, p
′
3];
player 2 is not locally optimal in routings [p′1, p2, p3], [p1, p
′
2, p
′
3], [p1, p
′
2, p3], and [p
′
1, p2, p
′
3]; and
player 3 is not locally optimal in routings [p′1, p
′
2, p3] and [p1, p2, p
′
3].
4.2 Sum-bucket Games
Here we describe sum-bucket games, which are variation of sum games that are stable and their
equilibria have good properties. Let R = (N, G,P) denote a sum-bucket routing game. The paths
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in P are divided into buckets B0, . . . , BlgL so that Bk is a set that contains all paths whose lengths
are in range [2k, 2k+1). (We use lgL instead of ⌈lgL⌉ to avoid notational clutter.) For any path
p ∈ P, let B(p) denote the index of the bucket that p belongs to; namely, if p ∈ Bk, then B(p) = k.
Consider now a routing p. We define the normalized length of path p ∈ p as Dp(p) = 2B(p)+1−1
(which is the maximum possible path length in bucket B(p)). Note that all the paths in the same
bucket have the same normalized length. For any path p we define the normalized congestion Cp(p)
to be the maximum congestion on any of the edges of path p which is caused by the paths of routing
p which belong to bucket B(p).
Player i’s cost is pci(p) = Ci(p) +Di(p). The player is allowed to switch from one bucket to
another. The normalized congestion of p is C(p) = maxpi∈p Ci(p), and the normalized length of
p is D(p) = maxpi∈p Di(p). The social cost of game R is SC(p) = C(p) +D(p). Below, we show
that sum-bucket games are stable and then we bound the price of anarchy.
4.2.1 Existence of Nash-routings in Sum-bucket Games
Here we show that sum-bucket games have Nash-routings. We use the same technique as in Sec-
tion 3.1, where we order the routings and prove that greedy moves give smaller order routings. Let
R = (N, G,P) be a sum-bucket routing game. Let r = N + 2L− 1 (this is the maximum possible
player cost). For any routing p we define the routing vector M(p) = [m1(p), . . . ,mr(p)] such that
mj(p) is the number of paths in p with cost j. We define a total order on the routings, with respect
to their vectors, in exactly the same way as wee did for the max games in Section 3.1. Using similar
techniques as in the max games, we can prove that if a greedy move by player i takes a routing
p to a new routing p′, then p′ < p. Since there are only a finite number of routings, every best
response dynamic converges in a finite time to a Nash-routing. Therefore, we get:
Theorem 4.2 (Stability of sum-bucket games) For any sum-bucket game R, every best re-
sponse dynamic converges to a Nash-routing.
4.2.2 Price of Anarchy in Sum-bucket Games
From Theorem 4.2, every sum-bucket game has at least one Nash-routing. Here, we bound the price
of anarchy. Consider a sum-bucket routing game R = (N, G,P), where G has n nodes. Consider a
Nash-routing p. Denote C = C(p) and D = D(p). Let p∗ be the optimum (coordinated) routing
with minimum social cost. Denote C
∗
= C(p∗) and D
∗
= D(p∗). Note that each payer i ∈ N
has a path in pi ∈ p and a corresponding “optimal” path p∗i ∈ p∗ from the player’s source to the
destination node. For any player i, let si denote the shortest path in P which connects the source
and destinations nodes of i. We now relate the paths lengths with the congestion:
Lemma 4.3 In Nash-routing p, for any player i with Ci ≥ C − x, where x ≥ 0, it holds that
|pi| ≤ |si|+ x+ 1.
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a player i with |pi| > |si| + x + 1.
Then, pci = Ci +Di ≥ C − x+Di ≥ C − x + |pi| > C − x + |si| + x+ 1 = C + |si| + 1. Clearly,
|si| ≤ 2B(si)+1 − 1. If user i was to switch to path si its cost would be pc′i ≤ C + 1 + 2B(si)+1 − 1,
since the normalized length of si is 2
B(si)+1−1, and si has normalized congestion at most C before
player i switches, and the normalized congestion of path si increases to at most C+1 after player i
switches to it. Therefore, pc′i ≤ C +1+ |si| < pci. Thus, in p player i would not be optimal, which
is a contradiction, since p is a Nash-routing. Therefore, |pi| ≤ |si|+ x+ 1, as needed.
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For each edge e ∈ G let Πe(p) denote the set of players whose paths in routing p use edge
e. Let Ce,pi(p) denote the number of packets that use edge e in p and are in the same bucket
as pi. Let Ce(p) = maxpi Ce,pi(p) denote the normalized congestion of edge e. For any edge e,
we define f(e, i) to be a set that contains all edges e′ ∈ p∗i with Ce′,p∗i (p) ≥ Ce,pi(p) − D
∗
. Let
f(e) = ∪i∈Πe(p)f(e, i), and for any set of edges X, f(X) =
⋃
e∈X f(e). It can be shown that in
Nash-routing p it holds |f(e, i)| ≥ 1.
Lemma 4.4 Let Z be the set that contains all edges e with congestion Ce(p) ≥ C − 2D∗ · lg n.
There is a set of edges X ⊆ Z with |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|.
Proof: We recursively construct a sets of edges E0, . . . , E2 lgn, such that Ei = Ei−1 ∪ f(Ei−1),
and set E0 contains all the edges e with congestion Ce(p) = C. We can show that there is a j,
0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n, such that |f(Ej)| ≤ 2|Ej |. Suppose for contradiction that such a j does not exist.
Thus for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n, it holds that |f(Ej)| > 2|Ej |. In this case, it it straightforward to
show that |Ek| > 2|Ek−1|, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 lg n. Since |E0| ≥ 1, it holds that |E2 lgn| > 22 lgn = n2.
However, this is a contradiction, since the number of edges in G cannot exceed n2. Thus, there is
a j with |f(Ej)| > 2|Ej |. We will set X = Ej .
It only remains to show that X ⊆ Z. It suffices to show that for any Ek and e ∈ Ek, Ce(p) ≥
C − kD∗, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 2 lg n. We prove this by induction on k. For k = 0 we have that every
edge in e has Ce(p) = C = C − 0 ·D∗, thus the claim trivially holds. For the induction hypothesis,
suppose that the claim holds for any k = t < 2 log n. In the induction step we will prove that the
claim holds also for k = t+ 1. We have that Et+1 = Et ∪ f(Et). By induction hypothesis, for any
e ∈ Et, Ce(p) ≥ C− tD∗ (thus, for any e ∈ Et it holds that Ce(p) ≥ C− (t+1)D∗)). Thus, for any
e ∈ Ek there is at least one path pi with Ce,pi(p) ≥ C − tD
∗
. By definition of f(e, i), every edge
e ∈ f(e, i) has the property that Ce′,p∗
i
(p) ≥ Ce,pi(p)−D
∗ ≥ C − (t+1)D∗. Thus, there is at least
one path p′ ∈ p which is in the same bucket with p∗i (namely, B(p′) = B(p∗i )) for which it holds
that Ce′,p′(p) = Ce′,p∗
i
(p). Therefore, Ce′(p) ≥ C− (t+1)D∗. Consequently, from the definition of
f(Et) it follows that for any edge e
′ ∈ f(Et) it holds that Ce′(p) ≥ C − (t+ 1)D∗. By considering
the union of Et ∪ f(Et), we have that the claim holds for any edge in e ∈ Et+1, as needed.
Lemma 4.5 In Nash-routing p it holds that C ≤ 18C∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n.
Proof: From Lemma 4.4, there is a set of edges X ⊂ Z with |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|. For each e ∈ Z it
holds that Ce(p) ≥ C − 2D∗ · lg n. Let Π =
⋃
e∈X Πe(p), that is, Π is the set of players which in
routing p their paths use edges in X. Let M =
∑
e∈X Ce(p), which denotes the total “normalized”
utilization of the edges in X. We have that M ≥ |X|(C − 2D∗ · lg n).
By construction, the congestion in routing p in each of the edges of X is caused only by the
players in Π. We can bound the path lengths of the players in Π with respect to D
∗
as follows.
Consider a player i ∈ Π. We have that Ci(p) ≥ C − 2D¯∗ · lg n. From Lemma 4.3 and the fact that
|si| ≤ D∗, we obtain: |pi| ≤ |si|+ 2D∗ · lg n+ 1 ≤ D∗ + 2D∗ · lg n+ 1 ≤ 4D∗ · lg n. Thus, the path
length of every player in Π is at most K = 4D
∗ · lg n.
M can also be bounded as M ≤ K|Π|. Consequently, |X|(C − 2D∗ · lg n) ≤ K|Π|, which gives:
C ≤ K|Π||X| + 2D
∗ · lg n = 4D
∗ · lg n · |Π|
|X| + 2D
∗ · lg n. (1)
Since |f(e, i)| ≥ 1, in the optimal routing p∗ the path of each user in Π has to use at least one edge
in f(X). Thus, in the optimal routing p∗, the edges in f(X) are used at least |Π| times. Thus, there
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is some edge e ∈ f(X) which in p∗ is used by at least |Π|/|f(X)| paths. Since there are lgL + 1
buckets, the normalized congestion of e in one of those buckets is at least |Π|/(|f(X)| · (lgL+ 1)).
Therefore, C
∗ ≥ |Π|/(|f(X)| · (lgL+ 1)). Since |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|, we obtain:
|Π| ≤ 2C∗ · |X| · (lgL+ 1) ≤ 4C∗ · |X| · lg n. (2)
By Combining Equations 1 and 2, we get: C ≤ 16C∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n+ 2D∗ lg n ≤ 18C∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n.
When C > D/4, using Lemma 4.5 it is straightforward to prove that PoA =
O((C
∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n)/(C∗ +D∗)). If C ≤ D/4, then using Lemma 4.3, we can prove that PoA = O(1)
(the details can be found in the appendix). Therefore, we obtain the main result:
Theorem 4.6 (Price of anarchy in sum-bucket games) For any sum-bucket game R it
holds:
PoA = O
(
C
∗ ·D∗
C
∗
+D
∗ · lg2 n
)
.
There is a sum-bucket game R = (N, G,P) that shows that the result of Theorem 4.6 is tight in
non-trivial cases. All the players have the same source node u and destination node v. Let a =
√
N
(suppose for simplicity that a =
√
N = ⌈√N⌉). There is a path p of length a from u to v. There are
a edge-disjoint paths Q = {q1, . . . , qa} from u to v so that each path qi has length a and uses one
edge of p. Each player has two paths in her strategy set: one is path p and the other is a path from
Q. Further, for each path qi there are a players that have qi in their strategy sets. Let p be the
routing where every player chooses path p. Then, p is a Nash-routing with social cost a+N . Let p′
be the routing where every player chooses the alternative path in Q. Then, p′ is also a Nash-routing
with social cost 2a. Thus, PoA ≥ SC(p′)/SC(p) ≥ (a+N)/(a + 1) = Ω(√N) = Ω(√n). Routing
p′ is an optimum routing with the smallest social cost C
∗
= C(p) = a and D
∗
= D(p) = a. Thus,
from Theorem 4.6, PoA = O((C
∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n)/(C∗ +D∗)) = O(a · lg2 n) = O(√n · log2 n). Hence,
the price of anarchy has to be within a log2 n factor from the bound provided in Theorem 4.6.
5 Conclusions
In this work we provided the first study (to our knowledge) of bicriteria routing games, where the
players attempt to simultaneously optimize two parameters: their path congestion and length. The
motivation is the existence of efficient packet scheduling algorithms which deliver the packets in
time proportional to the social cost. We examined max games and sum games. Max games stabilize,
but their price of anarchy is high. Sum games do not stabilize, but they can give better price of
anarchy. We then give the approximate sum-bucket games which always stabilize and preserve the
good properties of sum games. Surprisingly, arbitrary sum-bucket game equilibria provide good
approximations to the original coordinated routing problem.
Several open problems remain to examine. We studied two particular functions of the bicriteria,
namely, the max and the sum functions. There are other functions, for example a weighted sum, that
could provide similar or better results. It would also be interesting to add additional parameters.
The original C+D sum games do not stabilize in general. However, there exist interesting instances
which stabilize. For example, it can be easily shown that the games where the available paths have
equal lengths always stabilize. It would be interesting to find a general characterization of the
game instances that stabilize. Another interesting problem is to provide time efficient algorithms
for finding equilibria in our games.
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A Additional Proofs of Section 3.1
Lemma A.1 Minimum routing pmin achieves optimal social cost, that is, SC(pmin) ≤ SC(p), for
any other routing p 6= pmin.
Proof: Suppose for contradiction that there exists a routing p ≥ pmin with SC(p) < SC(pmin).
Let SC(p) = max(C(p),D(p)) = k1, and SC(pmin) = max(C(pmin),D(pmin)) = k2. Clearly,
k1 < k2. Therefore, in the vector M(p) = [m1, . . . ,mr] it holds that mk1 6= 0 and mk = 0 for
k > k1. Similarly, in the vector M(pmin) = [m̂1, . . . , m̂r] it holds that m̂k2 6= 0 and m̂k = 0 for
k > k2. Therefore, M(pmin) > M(p), contradicting the fact that p ≥ pmin.
B Additional Proofs of Section 4.1
In the table below we calculate the congestions, path lengths, and player costs for each routing
scenario of the game in Theorem 4.1. We set the specific lengths as: |p1| = 10, |p′1| = 8, |p2| =
7, |p′2| = 10, |p3| = 7, and |p′3| = 10. For a player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and routing p we define the
complementary routing to be the one where player i chooses the alternative path. For example,
for player 2 the complementary routing of [p1, p2, p3] is [p1, p
′
2, p3]. A player is locally optimal in a
routing if the complementary routing does not give a lower cost for the player. Using the table it
is easy to determine whether a player is locally optimal or not by examining the respective costs in
the complementary routings. In this way, we find the non-locally players which are shown in the
rightmost column of the table.
routing C1 D1 pc1 C2 D2 pc2 C3 D3 pc3 Non locally optimal players
[p1, p2, p3] 4 10 14 4 7 11 4 7 11 player 1
[p′1, p2, p3] 5 8 13 5 7 12 5 7 12 player 2
[p′1, p
′
2, p3] 5 8 13 1 10 11 5 7 12 player 3
[p′1, p
′
2, p
′
3] 5 8 13 1 10 11 1 10 11 player 1
[p1, p
′
2, p
′
3] 2 10 12 2 10 12 2 10 12 player 2
[p1, p2, p
′
3] 3 10 13 4 7 11 2 10 12 player 3
[p1, p
′
2, p3] 3 10 13 2 10 12 4 7 11 player 2
[p′1, p2, p
′
3] 5 8 13 5 7 12 1 10 11 player 2
C Additional Proofs of Section 4.2.1
Lemma C.1 If a greedy move by player i takes a routing p to a new routing p′, then p′ < p.
Proof: Let pi and p
′
i denote the paths of i in routings p and p
′, respectively. Let pci(p) =
Ci(p) + Di(p) = z1 and pci(p
′) = Ci(p
′) + Di(p
′) = z2. Since player i decreases its cost in p
′,
z2 < z1. Consider now the vectors of the routings M(p) = [m1, . . . ,mr] and M(p
′) = [m′1, . . . ,m
′
r].
We will show that M(p) < M(p′).
Let B(pi) = k1 and B(p
′
i) = k2. Let V denote the set of players whose cost increases in p
′ with
respect to their cost in p. Next, we show that for any j ∈ V it holds that pcj(p′) ≤ ci(p′), which
will help us to prove the desired result.
Let pj be the path of j ∈ V . Let B(pj) = k3 (note that j does not switch paths and buckets
between p and p′). If k3 6= k1 and k3 6= k2 then the cost of j remains unaffected between p and
i
p′. Thus, either k3 = k1 or k3 = k2. If k3 = k1, then the cost of j can only decrease from p to
p′, since path pi can no longer affect path pj . Therefore, it has to be that k3 = k2. Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, that pcj(p
′) > pci(p
′). Then, Cj(p
′) +Dj(p
′) > Ci(p
′) +Di(p
′). Since
both paths are in the same bucket, Dj(p
′) = Di(p
′), which implies that Cj(p
′) > Ci(p
′). Since
j ∈ V , Cj(p) < Cj(p′). The increase in normalized congestion of pj in p′ can only be caused by
p′i because it shares an edge with pj with congestion Cj(p
′). However, this is impossible since it
would imply that Ci(p
′) ≥ Cj(p′). Therefore, pcj(p′) ≤ pci(p′).
Consequently, in vector p′ all the entries in positions j2 + 1, . . . , r do not increase with respect
to p. Further, because i switches paths, mj1 > m
′
j2
. Thus, M(p) < M(p′), as needed.
D Additional Proofs of Section 4.2.2
Lemma D.1 In Nash-routing p, for every player i and edge e it holds that |f(e, i)| ≥ 1.
Proof: Suppose that |f(e, i)| = 0. Then for every edge e′ ∈ p∗i it holds that Ce′,p∗i (p) < Ce,pi(p)−
D
∗
. Let C
′
= maxe′∈p∗
i
Ce′,p∗
i
(p). If player i was to choose path p∗i its cost would be: pc
′
i ≤
C
′
+1+Dp∗
i
< Ce,pi(p)−D
∗
+1+D
∗
= Ce,pi(p)+1 ≤ Ci(p)+Di(p) = pci(p). Thus, pc′i < pci(p)
which implies that player i is not locally optimal in Nash-routing p, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4.6:
Suppose that p is the worst Nash-routing with maximum social cost. We have that PoA ≤
SC(p)/SC(p∗) ≤ (C +D)/(C∗ +D∗). We examine two cases:
• C > D/4: In this case D = O(C). From Lemma 4.5, C ≤ 18C∗ · D∗ · lg2 n. Therefore:
PoA = O(C/(C
∗
+D
∗
)) = O((C
∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n)/(C∗ +D∗)).
• C ≤ D/4: Let pi ∈ p be the path with maximum cost in p. Clearly, pci(p) = Ci + Di ≥
D. Further, 0 ≤ Ci(p) ≤ C ≤ D/4. Thus, Di ≥ D − Ci ≥ D − D/4 = 3D/4. Since
Ci ≥ 0 = C − C, Lemma 4.3 gives |pi| ≤ |si| + C + 1 ≤ D∗ + D/4 + 1. We have that
Di/2 < |pi|. Therefore, Di/2 < D∗ + D/4 + 1, which gives: 3D/8 < D∗ +D/4 + 1. Thus,
D < 8(D
∗
+ 1) ≤ 16D∗. In order words, D = O(D∗). Since, C = D, we obtain: PoA =
O(D/(C
∗
+D
∗
)) = O(D
∗
/(C
∗
+D
∗
)) = O(1).
By combining the two above cases we obtain the desirable result.
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Abstract
Two important metrics for measuring the quality of routing paths are the maximum edge con-
gestion C and maximum path length D. Here, we study bicriteria in routing games where each
player i selfishly selects a path that simultaneously minimizes its maximum edge congestion Ci
and path length Di. We study the stability and price of anarchy of two bicriteria games:
• Max games, where the social cost is max(C,D) and the player cost is max(Ci, Di). We
prove that max games are stable and convergent under best-response dynamics, and that
the price of anarchy is bounded above by the maximum path length in the players’ strategy
sets. We also show that this bound is tight in worst-case scenarios.
• Sum games, where the social cost is C+D and the player cost is Ci+Di. For sum games, we
first show the negative result that there are game instances that have no Nash-equilibria.
Therefore, we examine an approximate game called the sum-bucket game that is always
convergent (and therefore stable). We show that the price of anarchy in sum-bucket games
is bounded above by C∗ ·D∗/(C∗+D∗) (with a poly-log factor), where C∗ and D∗ are the
optimal coordinated congestion and path length. Thus, the sum-bucket game has typically
superior price of anarchy bounds than the max game. In fact, when either C∗ or D∗ is
small (e.g. constant) the social cost of the Nash-equilibria is very close to the coordinated
optimal C∗+D∗ (within a poly-log factor). We also show that the price of anarchy bound
is tight for cases where both C∗ and D∗ are large.
Regular presentation for SPAA
1 Introduction
Routing is a fundamental task in communication networks. Routing algorithms provide paths
for packets that will be sent over the network. There are two metrics that quantify the quality
of the paths returned by a routing algorithm: the congestion C, which is the maximum number
of paths that use any edge in the network, and the maximum path length D. Assuming there
is a packet for each path, a lower bound on the delivery time of the packets is Ω(max(C,D))
(alternatively, Ω(C +D)). Actually, there exist packet scheduling algorithms that given the paths,
they deliver the packets along the paths in time close to optimal O(max(C,D)) (alternatively,
O(C +D)) [?, ?, ?, ?, ?].
Motivated by the selfish behavior of entities in communication networks, we study routing games
where each packet’s path is controlled independently by a selfish player. We model games with N
players, where each player has to select a path from a source to a destination node. The objective of
each player i is to select a path that simultaneously minimizes two parameters: the congestion Ci,
which is the maximum number of paths that use any edge in player i’s path, and the path length
Di. We examine two kinds of games: max games, where the player’s cost function is max(Ci,Di),
and sum games, where the player’s cost function is Ci +Di. In each of these games, the player’s
objective is to selfishly minimize its cost in an uncoordinated manner. From the player’s point of
view, the minimization of the sum or max cost functions are justified objectives, since it is shown
in [?] that player i’s packet can be delivered in time O˜(Ci +Di) (alternatively, O˜(max(Ci,Di)).
A natural problem is to determine the effect of the players’ selfishness on the welfare of the whole
communication network. In the max and sum games, the welfare of the network is measured with
the social cost functions max(C,D) and C+D, respectively. The choice of these social cost functions
is appropriate since they determine the total time needed to deliver the packets represented by the
players. We examine the consequence of the selfish behavior in Nash equilibria, which are stable
states of the game where no player can unilaterally improve her situation. The effect of selfishness
is quantified with the price of anarchy (PoA) [?, ?], which expresses how much larger is the worst
social cost in a Nash equilibrium compared to the social cost in the optimal coordinated solution.
We study the existence of Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy for max games and sum games,
where we find that these games produce different results with their own merits.
1.1 Max Games
First, we examine max games (the social cost is max(C +D)). We prove that every max game has
at least one Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium can be obtained by best response dynamics, where
a player greedily changes, whenever possible, the current path to an alternative path with lower
cost. With best response moves the game eventually converges to a Nash-equilibrium. We show
that the optimal coordinated solution is a Nash-equilibrium too. Thus, max games games have very
good Nash equilibria. This observation is quantified in terms of the price of stability (PoS) [?, ?]
which expresses how much larger is the best social cost in a Nash equilibrium with respect to the
social cost in the optimal coordinated solution. Therefore in max games it holds that PoS = 1.
We then examine the worst Nash equilibria. We bound the price of anarchy (PoA) in max
games with respect to the maximum allowable path length L for the players in the network, and
the number of nodes n in the graph:
PoA = O(L+ log n).
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We prove that this bound is worst case optimal (within additive terms). Specifically, we provide
an example game in a ring network where the optimal coordinated social cost is 1, while there is a
Nash equilibrium with cost O(L) = O(n).
1.2 Sum Games
We continue with examining sum games (the social cost is C+D). Intuitively, sum games have the
potential to give better price of anarchy than the max games because both parameters (C and D)
affect the choices at all the time, even when one parameter is larger than the other. For example,
the ring game that we mentioned above has price of anarchy equal to 1 in the sum game. However,
we prove a limitation of sum games: not all sum games have Nash equilibria; there exist instances of
sum games with a small number of players that do not have Nash equilibria at all. This limitation
directed us towards exploring alternative games which are stable (have Nash equilibria) and have
similar characteristics with the original sum games.
We found such a game variation that we call sum-bucket game. In sum-bucket games the players
are divided into log n classes, called buckets, according to the packet paths that they choose. Bucket
k holds the paths of players with length in range [2k, 2k−1). Suppose that player i’s path is in bucket
k. The normalized congestion of player i, denoted Ci, is measured with respect to the paths that
belong to bucket k. The normalized length of player i’s path is Di = 2
k−1 − 1, (which is a factor
2 approximation of the original length). Player i’s cost function is Ci +Di. Thus, in sum-bucket
games only players in the same bucket compete with each other, while players in different buckets do
not interfere. The normalized social cost function is defined to be C+D, where C is the maximum
normalized congestion in any bucket, and D is the maximum normalized depth of all paths.
We first show that sum-bucket games always have Nash equilibria, which can be obtained with
best response dynamics. We then examine the quality of the Nash equilibria. For every game
there is a corresponding coordinated bucket routing problem. We can bound the price of anarchy
PoA with respect to the normalized optimal congestion C
∗
and normalized path length D
∗
in the
optimal coordinated solution. We obtain:
PoA = O
(
C
∗ ·D∗
C
∗
+D
∗ · log2 n
)
Therefore, when either of C
∗
or D
∗
is small (e.g. a constant), the Nash equilibrium provides a very
good approximation (within a poly-log factor from optimal) to the uncoordinated routing problem.
In such scenarios, the price of selfishness is small. However, when both C
∗
or D
∗
are simultaneously
large, the approximation becomes worse (though still typically lower than the PoA of the max game
since the PoA is bounded by the smaller of C
∗
or D
∗
, where D
∗
< 2L). Nevertheless, even in these
scenarios the PoA bound is tight in certain games instances.
Sum-bucket games are interesting variations of sum games because they are stable, and they
can be used to approximate solutions for the C +D social cost. For any sum-bucket game, there
is a corresponding “original” coordinated routing problem where the objective is to minimize the
social cost C + D without using buckets. It holds that C ≤ C ≤ C · log n and D ≤ D ≤ 2D;
thus, C + D = O(C · log n + D). In other words, the normalized social cost can be used as
an approximation for the “original” social cost. Let PoA′ denote how much larger is the worst
equilibrium of a sum-bucket game compared to the optimal solution of the coordinated original
problem (with respect to the social cost C +D). It holds that PoA′ ≤ PoA · log n. Consequently,
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the observations that we made above for the PoA in sum-bucket games apply also with respect to
the original routing problem. For example, when one of C∗ or D∗ is small (e.g. a constant), then
the Nash equilibrium of the sum-bucket game provides a very good approximation (within a poly
log factor from optimal) to the coordinated original routing problem.
1.3 Related Work
Routing games (on congestion) were introduced and studied in [?, ?]. The notion of price of
anarchy was introduced in [?]. Since then, many routing game models have been studied which are
distinguished by the topology of the network, cost functions, type of traffic (atomic or splittable),
nature of strategy sets, and kind of equilibria (pure or mixed). Specifically, pure equilibria with
atomic flow have been studied in [?, ?, ?, ?, ?] (our work fits into this category), and with splittable
flow in [?, ?, ?, ?]. Mixed equilibria with atomic flow have been studied in [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?,
?, ?], and with splittable flow in [?, ?].
To our knowledge there is no previous work that considers routing games that optimize two
criteria simultaneously. Most of the work in the literature uses a single cost metric which is related
to the congestion. A common metric for the player cost is the sum of the congestions on all the
edges of the player’s path (we denote this kind of player cost as pc′) and the respective social cost
is the cost of the worst player’s path (we denote this social cost as SC ′) [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. However,
as we discussed before, in packet scheduling algorithms, the pc′ or SC ′ do not govern the packet
delays; max(Ci,Di) or Ci +Di govern the packet delay.
Other combinations of player costs and social costs have been studied in the literature: player
cost pc′ and social cost C has been studied in [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]; player cost Ci and
social cost C has been studied in [?]; other variations have been studied in [?, ?, ?, ?]. The vast
majority of the work on routing games has been performed for parallel link networks, with only a
few exceptions on general network topologies [?, ?, ?, ?].
Our work is closer to [?]. We extended some results presented in [?] to apply to bicriteria,
instead of the single criterium of congestion, player cost Ci and social cost C, that was used
in [?]. Specifically, the particular techniques that we use to prove existence of Nash equilibria with
best response dynamics, and also to prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy, were originally
introduced in [?]. Here, we modified and extended appropriately these techniques in a non-trivial
way to apply to our new cost functions.
Outline of Paper
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we give basic definitions. We study max games in Section 3
and sum games in Section 4. We finish with our conclusions in Section 5. Due to space limitations
some proofs have moved to the appendix.
2 Definitions
An instance of a routing game is a tuple R = (N, G,P), where N = {1, 2, . . . , N} are the players,
G = (V,E) is a graph with nodes V and edges E, and the graph has paths P = ⋃i∈NPi, where
Pi is a collection of available paths in G for player i. Each path in Pi is a path in G that has the
same source ui ∈ V and destination vi ∈ V ; each path in Pi is a pure strategy available to player
i. A pure strategy profile p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ] is a collection of pure strategies (paths), one for each
3
player, where pi ∈ Pi. We refer to a pure strategy profile as a routing. On a finite network, a
routing game is necessarily a finite game.
For any routing p and any edge e ∈ E, the edge-congestion Ce(p) is the number of paths in
p that use edge e. For any path p, the path-congestion Cp(p) is the maximum edge congestion
over all edges in p, Cp(p) = maxe∈p Ce(p). We will use the notation Ci(p) = Cpi(p), for any
user i. The network congestion is the maximum edge-congestion over all edges in E, that is,
C(p) = maxe∈E Ce(p). We denote the length (number of edges) of any path p as |p|. For any user
i, we will also use the notation Dpi(p) or Di(p) to denote the length |pi|. The longest path length
in P is denoted L(P) = maxp∈P |p|. We will denote by D(p) the maximum path length in routing
p, that is D(p) = maxp∈p |p|. When the context is clear, we will drop the dependence on p and R
and use the notation Ce, Cp, Ci, C, L,Dp,Di,D.
For game R and routing p, the social cost (or global cost) is a function of routing p, and it
is denoted SC(p). The player or local cost is also a function on p denoted pci(p). We use the
standard notation p−i to refer to the collection of paths {p1, · · · , pi−1, pi+1, · · · , pN}, and (pi;p−i)
as an alternative notation for p which emphasizes the dependence on pi. Player i is locally optimal
in routing p if pci(p) ≤ pci(p′i;p−i) for all paths p′i ∈ Pi. A routing p is in a Nash Equilibrium
(we say p is a Nash-routing) if every player is locally optimal. Nash-routings quantify the notion
of a stable selfish outcome. A routing p∗ is an optimal pure strategy profile if it has minimum
attainable social cost: for any other pure strategy profile p, SC(p∗) ≤ SC(p).
We quantify the quality of the Nash-routings by the price of anarchy (PoA) (sometimes referred
to as the coordination ratio) and the price of stability (PoS). Let P denote the set of distinct Nash-
routings, and let SC∗ denote the social cost of an optimal routing p∗. Then,
PoS = inf
p∈ P
SC(p)
SC∗
, PoA = sup
p∈ P
SC(p)
SC∗
.
3 Max Games
Let R = (N, G,P) a routing game such that for any routing p the social cost function is SC(p) =
max(C(p),D(p)), and the player cost function pci(p) = max(Ci(p),Di(p)). We refer to such
routing games as max games. First, we show that max games have Nash-routings and the price of
stability is 1. Then, we bound the price of anarchy.
3.1 Existence of Nash-routings in Max Games
We show that max games have Nash-routings. We prove this result by first giving a totaly order
for the routings using a form of lexicographic ordering. Then we show that any greedy move of
a player can only give a new routing with smaller order. Thus, the greedy moves will converge
either to the smallest routing or to a routing where no player can improve further. In either case,
a Nash-routing will be reached.
Let R = (N, G,P) be a max routing game. Let r = max(N,L). For any routing p we define the
routing vector M(p) = [m1(p), . . . ,mr(p)], where mi(p) = ai(p) + bi(p), and ai(p) is the number
of paths with congestion i, and bi(p) is the number of paths with length i. Note that if SC(p) = k
then mk 6= 0 and m′k = 0 for all k′ > k.
We define a total order on the routings as follows. Let p and p′ be two routings, with M(p) =
[m1, . . . ,mr], and M(p
′) = [m′1, . . . ,m
′
r]. We say that M(p) = M(p
′) if mi = m
′
i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
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We say that M(p) < M(p′) if there is a j, 1 ≤ j ≤ r, such that mk = m′k for all k > j, and
mj < m
′
j . We order the p and p
′ according to the order of their respective vectors, that is p ≤ p′
if and only if M(p) ≤ M(p′). Note that for any two p and p′ it either holds that p = p′ or p < p′.
That is, the routings are totally ordered.
Consider an arbitrary routing p. If p is not a Nash-routing, there is at least one user i which
is not locally optimal. Then a greedy move is available to player i in which the player can obtain
lower cost by changing the path from pi to some other path p
′
i with lower cost. In other words,
the greedy move takes the original routing p = (pi;p−i) to a routing p
′ = (p′i;p
′
−i) with improved
player cost pci(p
′) < pci(p), such that pi is replaced by p
′
i and the remaining paths stay the same
(p−i = p
′
−i). We show now that any greedy move gives a smaller order routing:
Lemma 3.1 If a greedy move by any player takes a routing p to a new routing p′, then p′ < p.
Proof: Let pci(p) = max(Ci(p),Di(p)) = k
max
1 , and min(Ci(p),Di(p)) = k
min
1 (clearly, k
max
1 ≥
kmin1 ). Let also pci(p
′) = max(Ci(p
′),Di(p
′)) = kmax2 , and min(Ci(p
′),Di(p
′)) = kmin2 (clearly,
kmax2 ≥ kmin2 ). Since player i can decrease its cost in p′, kmax2 < kmax1 . Consider now the vectors
M(p) = [m1, . . . ,mr] and M(p
′) = [m′1, . . . ,m
′
r]. These two vectors are the same except possibly
for entries kmax1 , k
min
1 , k
max
2 , k
min
2 , which correspond to the positions that are affected by paths pi
and p′i. It holds that mkmax1 > m
′
kmax
1
, since when the path switches to p′i, mkmax1 = akmax1 + bkmax1
decreases by at least one because either akmax
1
decreases by one (if the new path has lower congestion)
or bkmax
1
decreases by one (if the new path has lower length). Since kmax2 < k
max
1 , M(p) > M(p
′)
implying that p > p′.
Since there are only a finite number of routings, Lemma 3.1 implies that starting from arbitrary
initial state, every best response dynamic converges in a finite time to a Nash-routing, where every
player is locally optimal. Since the routings are totally ordered, there is a routing pmin which is
the minimum, that is, for all routings p, pmin ≤ p. Clearly, the minimum routing is also a Nash-
routing. The minimum routing pmin achieves also optimal social cost, since if there was another
routing p′ with lower social cost, then it can be easily shown that p′ < pmin, which is contradiction.
Thus, the price of stability is 1. Therefore, we have the following result:
Theorem 3.2 (Stability of max games) For any max game R, every best response dynamic
converges to a Nash-routing, and the price of stability is PoS = 1.
3.2 Price of Anarchy in Max Games
We bound the price of anarchy in max games. Consider a max routing game R = (N, G,P), where
G has n nodes. Theorem 3.2 implies that there is at least one Nash-routing. Consider a Nash-
routing p. Denote C = C(p) and D = D(p). Let p∗ be the optimum (coordinated) routing with
minimum social cost. Denote C∗ = C(p∗) and D∗ = D(p∗). Note that each payer i ∈ N has a path
pi ∈ p and a corresponding “optimal” path p∗i ∈ p∗ from the player’s source to the destination.
For each edge e ∈ G, denote Πe(p) the set of players whose paths in routing p use edge e. We
define H to be a set that contains all edges e ∈ G with congestion Ce(p) ≥ D + 2. Consider an
edge e ∈ H. Let i ∈ Πe(p) be a player whose path pi in routing p uses edge e. We define f(e, i)
to be a set that contains all edges e′ ∈ p∗i with Ce′(p) ≥ Ce(p) − 1. It holds that |f(e, i)| ≥ 1,
since in routing p player i prefers path pi instead of p
∗
i because there is at least one edge e
′ ∈ p∗i
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with Ce′(p) ≥ Ce(p) − 1 > D. Let f(e) = ∪i∈Πe(p)f(e, i). For any set of edges X ⊂ H, we define
f(X) =
⋃
e∈X f(e).
Lemma 3.3 Let Z be the set that contains all edges e with congestion Ce(p) ≥ C − 2 log n. If
C ≥ D + 2 lg n+ 2, then there is a set of edges X ⊆ Z such that |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|.
Proof: We recursively construct a sets of edges E0, . . . , E2 lgn, such that Ei = Ei−1 ∪ f(Ei−1),
and set E0 contains all the edges e with congestion Ce(p) = C. From the construction of those
sets it holds that for any e ∈ Ej, Ce(p) ≥ C − j, where 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n. Thus, Ej ⊆ Z, for all
0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n. (Note that Z ⊆ H.)
We can show that there is a j, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n, such that |f(Ej)| ≤ 2|Ej |. Suppose for contra-
diction that such a j does not exist. Thus for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n, it holds that |f(Ej)| > 2|Ej |. In
this case, it it straightforward to show that |Ek| > 2|Ek−1|, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 lg n. Since |E0| ≥ 1,
it holds that |E2 lgn| > 22 lgn = n2. However, this is a contradiction, since the number of edges in
G do not exceed n2.
Lemma 3.4 If C ≥ D + 2 lg n+ 2, then C < 2LC∗ + 2 lg n.
Proof: From Lemma 3.3, there is a set of edges X ⊂ Z with |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|. For each e ∈ Z it
holds that Ce(p) ≥ C − 2 lg n. Let M =
∑
e∈X Ce(p) ≥ |X|(C − 2 lg n), where M denotes the total
utilization of the edges in X by the paths of the players in Π. Let Π =
⋃
e∈X Πe(p), that is, Π is
the set of players which in routing p their paths use edges in X. By construction, the congestion
in routing p in each of the edges of X is caused only by the players in Π. Since path lengths are
at most L, each player in Π can use at most L edges in X. Hence, M ≤ L · |Π|. Consequently,
|X|(C − 2 lg n) ≤ L · |Π|, which gives: C ≤ (L · |Π|)/|X| + 2 lg n.
By the definition of f(X), in the optimal routing p∗ each user in Π has to use at least one
edge in f(X). Thus, edges in the optimal routing p∗, the edges in f(X) are used at least Π times.
Thus, there is some edge e ∈ f(X) with Ce(p∗) ≥ |Π|/|f(X)|. Therefore, C∗ ≥ |Π|/|f(X)|. Since
|f(X)| ≤ 2|X|, we obtain |Π| ≤ 2C∗ · |X|. Therefore: C ≤ 2LC∗ + 2 lg n.
Theorem 3.5 (Price of anarchy in max games) For any max game R it holds that PoA =
O(L+ log n).
Proof: Suppose that p is the worst Nash-routing with maximum social cost. We have
PoA = SC(p)/SC(p∗). If C ≥ D + 2 lg n + 2, then SC(p) = C. From Theorem 3.4,
PoA ≤ C/max(C∗,D∗) ≤ (2LC∗ + 2 lg n)/C∗ ≤ 2L + 2 lg n. If C < D + 2 lg n + 2, then
SC(p) < D + 2 lg n+ 2; thus PoA ≤ L+ 2 lg n+ 2. Hence, in both cases PoA = O(L+ log n).
There is a max game that shows that the result of Theorem 3.5 is tight in the worst case.
Consider a ring network with n nodes and n edges. Give the same orientation to the edges, so that
each edge has one left node and one right node. For each edge ei, there is a corresponding player i
whose source is the left node and the destination is the right node of the edge. The strategy set of
each player has two paths: path pi which is only the edge ei, and path p
′
i which goes around the ring.
Note that p = [p1, p2, . . . , pn] is a Nash-routing with social cost 1. However, p
′ = [p1, p2, . . . , pn] is
also a Nash routing with social cost n− 1. Thus, the price of anarchy is O(n) = O(L).
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4 Sum Games
Let R = (N, G,P) be a routing game such that for any routing p the social cost function is
SC(p) = C(p) + D(p), and the player cost function pci(p) = Ci(p) + Di(p). We refer to such
routing games as sum games. We first show that such games have instances without Nash-routings.
Then we describe a variation of sum games, that we call sum-bucket games, which are stable and
their equilibria have good properties.
4.1 A Sum Game without Nash-routings
Theorem 4.1 There is sum game instance R = (N, G,P) that has no Nash-routing.
Proof: The graph G is depicted in the figure below. There are seven players, namely, N =
{1, . . . , 7}. Players 1, 2, and 3, have respective strategy sets P1 = {p1, p′1}, P2 = {p2, p′2}, and
P3 = {p3, p′3}. In the figure for player i = 1, . . . , 3 the respective source and destination nodes are
ui and vi. There are six critical edges denoted e1, . . . , e6 that the paths use and which are shown in
the figure as straight horizontal lines. These edges may have congestion larger than 1. The squiggly
part of the paths are assumed to have congestion 1 and their length and their lengths are chosen
so that the following relations hold: |p′1| = |p1| − 2, |p′2| = |p2|+ 3, and |p′3| = |p3|+ 3.
p1 p1
p
′
1p
′
1
p2
p2
p3
p3
p
′
3
p
′
3
p
′
2
p
′
2
p1p
′
3 p1p2p3p1p
′
2
p
′
1p2 p
′
1p3
u1 u2 u3
e1 e2 e3
e4
(+1)
v1
e6e5
p
′
1
(+3) (+3) (+4)
v2v3
p2
p3
Players 4 to 7 are “passive” in the sense that they have only one path in their strategy sets,
and their sole purpose is to create additional congestion on edges e3, e4, e5, e6 (the paths of these
players are not shown explicitly in the figure). In particular, the passive players cause additional
congestion 1 to edge e3, additional congestion 3 to e4 and e5, and additional congestion 4 to e6.
The additional congestion is depicted in the figure inside a parenthesis under each edge.
Since the only “active” players are 1, 2, and 3, and each player has two path choices, there are
eight possible different routings. We examine each routing and prove that it is not a Nash-routing.
We use the vector [p1, p2, p3] to denote a routing where the ith position of the vector contains the
path choice of user i. By setting explicit values to the path lengths, and computing the player costs
in each routing, we find that: player 1 is not locally optimal in routings [p1, p2, p3] and [p
′
1, p
′
2, p
′
3];
player 2 is not locally optimal in routings [p′1, p2, p3], [p1, p
′
2, p
′
3], [p1, p
′
2, p3], and [p
′
1, p2, p
′
3]; and
player 3 is not locally optimal in routings [p′1, p
′
2, p3] and [p1, p2, p
′
3].
4.2 Sum-bucket Games
Here we describe sum-bucket games, which are variation of sum games that are stable and their
equilibria have good properties. Let R = (N, G,P) denote a sum-bucket routing game. The paths
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in P are divided into buckets B0, . . . , BlgL so that Bk is a set that contains all paths whose lengths
are in range [2k, 2k+1). (We use lgL instead of ⌈lgL⌉ to avoid notational clutter.) For any path
p ∈ P, let B(p) denote the index of the bucket that p belongs to; namely, if p ∈ Bk, then B(p) = k.
Consider now a routing p. We define the normalized length of path p ∈ p as Dp(p) = 2B(p)+1−1
(which is the maximum possible path length in bucket B(p)). Note that all the paths in the same
bucket have the same normalized length. For any path p we define the normalized congestion Cp(p)
to be the maximum congestion on any of the edges of path p which is caused by the paths of routing
p which belong to bucket B(p).
Player i’s cost is pci(p) = Ci(p) +Di(p). The player is allowed to switch from one bucket to
another. The normalized congestion of p is C(p) = maxpi∈p Ci(p), and the normalized length of
p is D(p) = maxpi∈p Di(p). The social cost of game R is SC(p) = C(p) +D(p). Below, we show
that sum-bucket games are stable and then we bound the price of anarchy.
4.2.1 Existence of Nash-routings in Sum-bucket Games
Here we show that sum-bucket games have Nash-routings. We use the same technique as in Sec-
tion 3.1, where we order the routings and prove that greedy moves give smaller order routings. Let
R = (N, G,P) be a sum-bucket routing game. Let r = N + 2L− 1 (this is the maximum possible
player cost). For any routing p we define the routing vector M(p) = [m1(p), . . . ,mr(p)] such that
mj(p) is the number of paths in p with cost j. We define a total order on the routings, with respect
to their vectors, in exactly the same way as wee did for the max games in Section 3.1. Using similar
techniques as in the max games, we can prove that if a greedy move by player i takes a routing
p to a new routing p′, then p′ < p. Since there are only a finite number of routings, every best
response dynamic converges in a finite time to a Nash-routing. Therefore, we get:
Theorem 4.2 (Stability of sum-bucket games) For any sum-bucket game R, every best re-
sponse dynamic converges to a Nash-routing.
4.2.2 Price of Anarchy in Sum-bucket Games
From Theorem 4.2, every sum-bucket game has at least one Nash-routing. Here, we bound the price
of anarchy. Consider a sum-bucket routing game R = (N, G,P), where G has n nodes. Consider a
Nash-routing p. Denote C = C(p) and D = D(p). Let p∗ be the optimum (coordinated) routing
with minimum social cost. Denote C
∗
= C(p∗) and D
∗
= D(p∗). Note that each payer i ∈ N
has a path in pi ∈ p and a corresponding “optimal” path p∗i ∈ p∗ from the player’s source to the
destination node. For any player i, let si denote the shortest path in P which connects the source
and destinations nodes of i. We now relate the paths lengths with the congestion:
Lemma 4.3 In Nash-routing p, for any player i with Ci ≥ C − x, where x ≥ 0, it holds that
|pi| ≤ |si|+ x+ 1.
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a player i with |pi| > |si| + x + 1.
Then, pci = Ci +Di ≥ C − x+Di ≥ C − x + |pi| > C − x + |si| + x+ 1 = C + |si| + 1. Clearly,
|si| ≤ 2B(si)+1 − 1. If user i was to switch to path si its cost would be pc′i ≤ C + 1 + 2B(si)+1 − 1,
since the normalized length of si is 2
B(si)+1−1, and si has normalized congestion at most C before
player i switches, and the normalized congestion of path si increases to at most C+1 after player i
switches to it. Therefore, pc′i ≤ C +1+ |si| < pci. Thus, in p player i would not be optimal, which
is a contradiction, since p is a Nash-routing. Therefore, |pi| ≤ |si|+ x+ 1, as needed.
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For each edge e ∈ G let Πe(p) denote the set of players whose paths in routing p use edge
e. Let Ce,pi(p) denote the number of packets that use edge e in p and are in the same bucket
as pi. Let Ce(p) = maxpi Ce,pi(p) denote the normalized congestion of edge e. For any edge e,
we define f(e, i) to be a set that contains all edges e′ ∈ p∗i with Ce′,p∗i (p) ≥ Ce,pi(p) − D
∗
. Let
f(e) = ∪i∈Πe(p)f(e, i), and for any set of edges X, f(X) =
⋃
e∈X f(e). It can be shown that in
Nash-routing p it holds |f(e, i)| ≥ 1.
Lemma 4.4 Let Z be the set that contains all edges e with congestion Ce(p) ≥ C − 2D∗ · lg n.
There is a set of edges X ⊆ Z with |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|.
Proof: We recursively construct a sets of edges E0, . . . , E2 lgn, such that Ei = Ei−1 ∪ f(Ei−1),
and set E0 contains all the edges e with congestion Ce(p) = C. We can show that there is a j,
0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n, such that |f(Ej)| ≤ 2|Ej |. Suppose for contradiction that such a j does not exist.
Thus for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 lg n, it holds that |f(Ej)| > 2|Ej |. In this case, it it straightforward to
show that |Ek| > 2|Ek−1|, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ 2 lg n. Since |E0| ≥ 1, it holds that |E2 lgn| > 22 lgn = n2.
However, this is a contradiction, since the number of edges in G cannot exceed n2. Thus, there is
a j with |f(Ej)| > 2|Ej |. We will set X = Ej .
It only remains to show that X ⊆ Z. It suffices to show that for any Ek and e ∈ Ek, Ce(p) ≥
C − kD∗, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 2 lg n. We prove this by induction on k. For k = 0 we have that every
edge in e has Ce(p) = C = C − 0 ·D∗, thus the claim trivially holds. For the induction hypothesis,
suppose that the claim holds for any k = t < 2 log n. In the induction step we will prove that the
claim holds also for k = t+ 1. We have that Et+1 = Et ∪ f(Et). By induction hypothesis, for any
e ∈ Et, Ce(p) ≥ C− tD∗ (thus, for any e ∈ Et it holds that Ce(p) ≥ C− (t+1)D∗)). Thus, for any
e ∈ Ek there is at least one path pi with Ce,pi(p) ≥ C − tD
∗
. By definition of f(e, i), every edge
e ∈ f(e, i) has the property that Ce′,p∗
i
(p) ≥ Ce,pi(p)−D
∗ ≥ C − (t+1)D∗. Thus, there is at least
one path p′ ∈ p which is in the same bucket with p∗i (namely, B(p′) = B(p∗i )) for which it holds
that Ce′,p′(p) = Ce′,p∗
i
(p). Therefore, Ce′(p) ≥ C− (t+1)D∗. Consequently, from the definition of
f(Et) it follows that for any edge e
′ ∈ f(Et) it holds that Ce′(p) ≥ C − (t+ 1)D∗. By considering
the union of Et ∪ f(Et), we have that the claim holds for any edge in e ∈ Et+1, as needed.
Lemma 4.5 In Nash-routing p it holds that C ≤ 18C∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n.
Proof: From Lemma 4.4, there is a set of edges X ⊂ Z with |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|. For each e ∈ Z it
holds that Ce(p) ≥ C − 2D∗ · lg n. Let Π =
⋃
e∈X Πe(p), that is, Π is the set of players which in
routing p their paths use edges in X. Let M =
∑
e∈X Ce(p), which denotes the total “normalized”
utilization of the edges in X. We have that M ≥ |X|(C − 2D∗ · lg n).
By construction, the congestion in routing p in each of the edges of X is caused only by the
players in Π. We can bound the path lengths of the players in Π with respect to D
∗
as follows.
Consider a player i ∈ Π. We have that Ci(p) ≥ C − 2D¯∗ · lg n. From Lemma 4.3 and the fact that
|si| ≤ D∗, we obtain: |pi| ≤ |si|+ 2D∗ · lg n+ 1 ≤ D∗ + 2D∗ · lg n+ 1 ≤ 4D∗ · lg n. Thus, the path
length of every player in Π is at most K = 4D
∗ · lg n.
M can also be bounded as M ≤ K|Π|. Consequently, |X|(C − 2D∗ · lg n) ≤ K|Π|, which gives:
C ≤ K|Π||X| + 2D
∗ · lg n = 4D
∗ · lg n · |Π|
|X| + 2D
∗ · lg n. (1)
Since |f(e, i)| ≥ 1, in the optimal routing p∗ the path of each user in Π has to use at least one edge
in f(X). Thus, in the optimal routing p∗, the edges in f(X) are used at least |Π| times. Thus, there
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is some edge e ∈ f(X) which in p∗ is used by at least |Π|/|f(X)| paths. Since there are lgL + 1
buckets, the normalized congestion of e in one of those buckets is at least |Π|/(|f(X)| · (lgL+ 1)).
Therefore, C
∗ ≥ |Π|/(|f(X)| · (lgL+ 1)). Since |f(X)| ≤ 2|X|, we obtain:
|Π| ≤ 2C∗ · |X| · (lgL+ 1) ≤ 4C∗ · |X| · lg n. (2)
By Combining Equations 1 and 2, we get: C ≤ 16C∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n+ 2D∗ lg n ≤ 18C∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n.
When C > D/4, using Lemma 4.5 it is straightforward to prove that PoA =
O((C
∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n)/(C∗ +D∗)). If C ≤ D/4, then using Lemma 4.3, we can prove that PoA = O(1)
(the details can be found in the appendix). Therefore, we obtain the main result:
Theorem 4.6 (Price of anarchy in sum-bucket games) For any sum-bucket game R it
holds:
PoA = O
(
C
∗ ·D∗
C
∗
+D
∗ · lg2 n
)
.
There is a sum-bucket game R = (N, G,P) that shows that the result of Theorem 4.6 is tight in
non-trivial cases. All the players have the same source node u and destination node v. Let a =
√
N
(suppose for simplicity that a =
√
N = ⌈√N⌉). There is a path p of length a from u to v. There are
a edge-disjoint paths Q = {q1, . . . , qa} from u to v so that each path qi has length a and uses one
edge of p. Each player has two paths in her strategy set: one is path p and the other is a path from
Q. Further, for each path qi there are a players that have qi in their strategy sets. Let p be the
routing where every player chooses path p. Then, p is a Nash-routing with social cost a+N . Let p′
be the routing where every player chooses the alternative path in Q. Then, p′ is also a Nash-routing
with social cost 2a. Thus, PoA ≥ SC(p′)/SC(p) ≥ (a+N)/(a + 1) = Ω(√N) = Ω(√n). Routing
p′ is an optimum routing with the smallest social cost C
∗
= C(p) = a and D
∗
= D(p) = a. Thus,
from Theorem 4.6, PoA = O((C
∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n)/(C∗ +D∗)) = O(a · lg2 n) = O(√n · log2 n). Hence,
the price of anarchy has to be within a log2 n factor from the bound provided in Theorem 4.6.
5 Conclusions
In this work we provided the first study (to our knowledge) of bicriteria routing games, where the
players attempt to simultaneously optimize two parameters: their path congestion and length. The
motivation is the existence of efficient packet scheduling algorithms which deliver the packets in
time proportional to the social cost. We examined max games and sum games. Max games stabilize,
but their price of anarchy is high. Sum games do not stabilize, but they can give better price of
anarchy. We then give the approximate sum-bucket game which always stabilizes and preserve the
good properties of sum games. Surprisingly, arbitrary sum-bucket game equilibria provide good
approximations to the original coordinated routing problem.
Several open problems remain to examine. We studied two particular functions of the bicriteria,
namely, the max and the sum functions. There are other functions, for example a weighted sum, that
could provide similar or better results. It would also be interesting to add additional parameters.
The original C+D sum games do not stabilize in general. However, there exist interesting instances
which stabilize. For example, it can be easily shown that the games where the available paths have
equal lengths always stabilize. It would be interesting to find a general characterization of the
game instances that stabilize. Another interesting problem is to provide time efficient algorithms
for finding equilibria in our games.
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A Additional Proofs of Section 3.1
Lemma A.1 Minimum routing pmin achieves optimal social cost, that is, SC(pmin) ≤ SC(p), for
any other routing p 6= pmin.
Proof: Suppose for contradiction that there exists a routing p ≥ pmin with SC(p) < SC(pmin).
Let SC(p) = max(C(p),D(p)) = k1, and SC(pmin) = max(C(pmin),D(pmin)) = k2. Clearly,
k1 < k2. Therefore, in the vector M(p) = [m1, . . . ,mr] it holds that mk1 6= 0 and mk = 0 for
k > k1. Similarly, in the vector M(pmin) = [m̂1, . . . , m̂r] it holds that m̂k2 6= 0 and m̂k = 0 for
k > k2. Therefore, M(pmin) > M(p), contradicting the fact that p ≥ pmin.
B Additional Proofs of Section 4.1
In the table below we calculate the congestions, path lengths, and player costs for each routing
scenario of the game in Theorem 4.1. We set the specific lengths as: |p1| = 10, |p′1| = 8, |p2| =
7, |p′2| = 10, |p3| = 7, and |p′3| = 10. For a player i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and routing p we define the
complementary routing to be the one where player i chooses the alternative path. For example,
for player 2 the complementary routing of [p1, p2, p3] is [p1, p
′
2, p3]. A player is locally optimal in a
routing if the complementary routing does not give a lower cost for the player. Using the table it
is easy to determine whether a player is locally optimal or not by examining the respective costs in
the complementary routings. In this way, we find the non-locally players which are shown in the
rightmost column of the table.
routing C1 D1 pc1 C2 D2 pc2 C3 D3 pc3 Non locally optimal players
[p1, p2, p3] 4 10 14 4 7 11 4 7 11 player 1
[p′1, p2, p3] 5 8 13 5 7 12 5 7 12 player 2
[p′1, p
′
2, p3] 5 8 13 1 10 11 5 7 12 player 3
[p′1, p
′
2, p
′
3] 5 8 13 1 10 11 1 10 11 player 1
[p1, p
′
2, p
′
3] 2 10 12 2 10 12 2 10 12 player 2
[p1, p2, p
′
3] 3 10 13 4 7 11 2 10 12 player 3
[p1, p
′
2, p3] 3 10 13 2 10 12 4 7 11 player 2
[p′1, p2, p
′
3] 5 8 13 5 7 12 1 10 11 player 2
C Additional Proofs of Section 4.2.1
Lemma C.1 If a greedy move by player i takes a routing p to a new routing p′, then p′ < p.
Proof: Let pi and p
′
i denote the paths of i in routings p and p
′, respectively. Let pci(p) =
Ci(p) + Di(p) = z1 and pci(p
′) = Ci(p
′) + Di(p
′) = z2. Since player i decreases its cost in p
′,
z2 < z1. Consider now the vectors of the routings M(p) = [m1, . . . ,mr] and M(p
′) = [m′1, . . . ,m
′
r].
We will show that M(p) < M(p′).
Let B(pi) = k1 and B(p
′
i) = k2. Let V denote the set of players whose cost increases in p
′ with
respect to their cost in p. Next, we show that for any j ∈ V it holds that pcj(p′) ≤ ci(p′), which
will help us to prove the desired result.
Let pj be the path of j ∈ V . Let B(pj) = k3 (note that j does not switch paths and buckets
between p and p′). If k3 6= k1 and k3 6= k2 then the cost of j remains unaffected between p and
i
p′. Thus, either k3 = k1 or k3 = k2. If k3 = k1, then the cost of j can only decrease from p to
p′, since path pi can no longer affect path pj . Therefore, it has to be that k3 = k2. Suppose, for
the sake of contradiction, that pcj(p
′) > pci(p
′). Then, Cj(p
′) +Dj(p
′) > Ci(p
′) +Di(p
′). Since
both paths are in the same bucket, Dj(p
′) = Di(p
′), which implies that Cj(p
′) > Ci(p
′). Since
j ∈ V , Cj(p) < Cj(p′). The increase in normalized congestion of pj in p′ can only be caused by
p′i because it shares an edge with pj with congestion Cj(p
′). However, this is impossible since it
would imply that Ci(p
′) ≥ Cj(p′). Therefore, pcj(p′) ≤ pci(p′).
Consequently, in vector p′ all the entries in positions j2 + 1, . . . , r do not increase with respect
to p. Further, because i switches paths, mj1 > m
′
j2
. Thus, M(p) < M(p′), as needed.
D Additional Proofs of Section 4.2.2
Lemma D.1 In Nash-routing p, for every player i and edge e it holds that |f(e, i)| ≥ 1.
Proof: Suppose that |f(e, i)| = 0. Then for every edge e′ ∈ p∗i it holds that Ce′,p∗i (p) < Ce,pi(p)−
D
∗
. Let C
′
= maxe′∈p∗
i
Ce′,p∗
i
(p). If player i was to choose path p∗i its cost would be: pc
′
i ≤
C
′
+1+Dp∗
i
< Ce,pi(p)−D
∗
+1+D
∗
= Ce,pi(p)+1 ≤ Ci(p)+Di(p) = pci(p). Thus, pc′i < pci(p)
which implies that player i is not locally optimal in Nash-routing p, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4.6:
Suppose that p is the worst Nash-routing with maximum social cost. We have that PoA ≤
SC(p)/SC(p∗) ≤ (C +D)/(C∗ +D∗). We examine two cases:
• C > D/4: In this case D = O(C). From Lemma 4.5, C ≤ 18C∗ · D∗ · lg2 n. Therefore:
PoA = O(C/(C
∗
+D
∗
)) = O((C
∗ ·D∗ · lg2 n)/(C∗ +D∗)).
• C ≤ D/4: Let pi ∈ p be the path with maximum cost in p. Clearly, pci(p) = Ci + Di ≥
D. Further, 0 ≤ Ci(p) ≤ C ≤ D/4. Thus, Di ≥ D − Ci ≥ D − D/4 = 3D/4. Since
Ci ≥ 0 = C − C, Lemma 4.3 gives |pi| ≤ |si| + C + 1 ≤ D∗ + D/4 + 1. We have that
Di/2 < |pi|. Therefore, Di/2 < D∗ + D/4 + 1, which gives: 3D/8 < D∗ +D/4 + 1. Thus,
D < 8(D
∗
+ 1) ≤ 16D∗. In order words, D = O(D∗). Since, C = D, we obtain: PoA =
O(D/(C
∗
+D
∗
)) = O(D
∗
/(C
∗
+D
∗
)) = O(1).
By combining the two above cases we obtain the desirable result.
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